Spivak begins the essay by critiquing Foucault and Deluze who are inattentive to their own position of power in narrating a third world subject, and are ignorant of the implications of transplanting western ideological theories into colonial discourse of oppression. In a debate, Foucault and Deluze emphasized on the "counter-productiveness to reduce the networks of power/desire/interest because they are so heterogeneous and the need for intellectuals to disclose their knowledge and know the discourse of the Other." Yet, she writes, "they systematically ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual and economic history" (66). She argues that the representation of 'subalterns' by western intellectuals is one that they have unconsciously created themselves by falsely pretending to be "transparent" (The example given is of Foucault where in an interview at an "unguarded moment" he gives away the pretense). She argues the knowledge production in the west is also a commodity having deep roots in social, economic and institutional capital. Spivak questions the use of the terms, 'Maoist' and ' the worker's struggle' by French theorists in their discourse of revolution. She criticizes the usage of these essentialist terms as they assume a cultural solidarity for a heterogeneous group. Foucault and Deluze, she argues, represent the Other through their own cultural system. The second part of the essay clarifies the meaning of Subject and Subjectivity in Subaltern studies as compared to the Marxist Subject. She argues that colonial Subject is a heterogenous entity and cannot be understood as an undivided consciousness striving for the same things. She writes, "My view is that radical practice should attend to this double session of representations rather than reintroduce the individual subject through totalizing concepts of power and desire" (74).
In arguing against Foucault's narrative of the epistemic violence as being located in late 18th century Europe, Spivak uses examples from 17th and 18th century colonial India. First, she examines the British reformation of traditional legal system in India that was based on Hindu Dharmashastra that used Shruti, Smruti, Shastra, Vyavahara as four tools in settling disputes. The codification of these traditional laws in accordance to British value system is symbolic of the epistemic violence by the colonizers. Accompanied by suppression of Sanskrit in the overhauled educational system, a version of history was gradually established where Brahmins were shown to have same intentions as the British in writing down the laws in 'high culture' Sanskrit and making them rigid and inaccessible to lower castes, peasants, and tribals. Here, she argues, that while Foucault and Deluze propose that the 'oppressed' in the first-world can speak or revolt, they do because they have access to socialized capital (Foucault) and know their conditions, whereas the subaltern of the third world cannot.
The final part of the essay uses the example of Sati practice in 18th century India and the suicide of an Indian woman to further explain the notions of epistemic violence in the colonized nation. Indian women were initially 'spoken for' by the learned Brahmins (men) who inscribed the importance of Sati (widows committing suicide by jumping into the burning pyre of their dead husband), and indirectly controlled what an 'ideal Hindu woman', 'a good wife' should and shouldn't do. Here, even though several Indian narratives portray women as voluntarily wanting to commit suicide post their husband's death, one should be aware that these women were a part of intrinsic belief system that was circulated through generations by power yielding Brahmins (brown men). As Spivak's often misunderstood and controversial sentence - "White men saving brown women from brown men" - suggests, at the end of 18th century, British reformers noticing this barbaric practice banned the practice of Sati, much to the anger of brown men. The larger point of this example is to showcase that women who belonged to the lowest strata of the subaltern, had absolutely no agency. First, they were ‘spoken for’ by the Brahmins, and then by the British. They could not speak. Additionally, as the suicide of Bhuvaneswari indicates, despite trying to displace the sanctioned hegemonic narrative, the subaltern as female cannot even be heard or read.
Paragraph Summary:
Spivak's question is not one that looks for a binary answer, but it rather is an enquiry into the agency of a subaltern and whether it is possible for a subaltern to speak. Even as she answers her own question negatively, she presents a four-fold argument on the nature and perceptions of the colonial Subaltern by the western world, by calling intellectual behemoths as her witnesses.
a) Western theorists impose their own value system when examining the Subaltern. b) The Subject cannot be described in Marxian terms as an undivided personality. It has to be understood as "divided and dislocated subjects whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other". c) Earlier explorations of the Subaltern studies Collective examined the colonial Subject as a coherent whole and suppressed the heterogeneity of the subaltern consciousness. She cautions the subaltern theorists that the voice of the Subaltern is being heard through a group of intellectuals, which can seem like French theorists' who speak for oppressed groups using essentialist terms of 'workers' or 'maoists'. d) Using the example of British codifying Hindu laws and legal system, she argues that "epistemic violence" -- a complete overhaul of the episteme -- is not located in Europe at the end of 18th century as Foucault identifies, but rather is present in the epistemic violence carried out by Europe in the nations it colonized.
In arguing against Foucault's narrative of the epistemic violence as being located in late 18th century Europe, Spivak uses examples from 17th and 18th century colonial India. First, she examines the British reformation of traditional legal system in India that was based on Hindu Dharmashastra that used Shruti, Smruti, Shastra, Vyavahara as four tools in settling disputes. The codification of these traditional laws in accordance to British value system is symbolic of the epistemic violence by the colonizers. Accompanied by suppression of Sanskrit in the overhauled educational system, a version of history was gradually established where Brahmins were shown to have same intentions as the British in writing down the laws in 'high culture' Sanskrit and making them rigid and inaccessible to lower castes, peasants, and tribals. Here, she argues, that while Foucault and Deluze propose that the 'oppressed' in the first-world can speak or revolt, they do because they have access to socialized capital (Foucault) and know their conditions, whereas the subaltern of the third world cannot.
The final part of the essay uses the example of Sati practice in 18th century India and the suicide of an Indian woman to further explain the notions of epistemic violence in the colonized nation. Indian women were initially 'spoken for' by the learned Brahmins (men) who inscribed the importance of Sati (widows committing suicide by jumping into the burning pyre of their dead husband), and indirectly controlled what an 'ideal Hindu woman', 'a good wife' should and shouldn't do. Here, even though several Indian narratives portray women as voluntarily wanting to commit suicide post their husband's death, one should be aware that these women were a part of intrinsic belief system that was circulated through generations by power yielding Brahmins (brown men). As Spivak's often misunderstood and controversial sentence - "White men saving brown women from brown men" - suggests, at the end of 18th century, British reformers noticing this barbaric practice banned the practice of Sati, much to the anger of brown men. The larger point of this example is to showcase that women who belonged to the lowest strata of the subaltern, had absolutely no agency. First, they were ‘spoken for’ by the Brahmins, and then by the British. They could not speak. Additionally, as the suicide of Bhuvaneswari indicates, despite trying to displace the sanctioned hegemonic narrative, the subaltern as female cannot even be heard or read.
Paragraph Summary:
Spivak's question is not one that looks for a binary answer, but it rather is an enquiry into the agency of a subaltern and whether it is possible for a subaltern to speak. Even as she answers her own question negatively, she presents a four-fold argument on the nature and perceptions of the colonial Subaltern by the western world, by calling intellectual behemoths as her witnesses.
a) Western theorists impose their own value system when examining the Subaltern. b) The Subject cannot be described in Marxian terms as an undivided personality. It has to be understood as "divided and dislocated subjects whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other". c) Earlier explorations of the Subaltern studies Collective examined the colonial Subject as a coherent whole and suppressed the heterogeneity of the subaltern consciousness. She cautions the subaltern theorists that the voice of the Subaltern is being heard through a group of intellectuals, which can seem like French theorists' who speak for oppressed groups using essentialist terms of 'workers' or 'maoists'. d) Using the example of British codifying Hindu laws and legal system, she argues that "epistemic violence" -- a complete overhaul of the episteme -- is not located in Europe at the end of 18th century as Foucault identifies, but rather is present in the epistemic violence carried out by Europe in the nations it colonized.