Rethinking History / Keith Jenkins /1991

School of thought: Postmodern

Text: Critiquing conventional view of history

Scholars from same school (mentioned in the book): Hayden White, Michel Foucault, David Lowenthall, Lyotard

Summary:
Jenkins compellingly argues that the conventional view of history in academia is greatly flawed. Coming from a postmodernist school, Jenkins argues that there is no 'one' history, but there are many histories. Even well trained historians' methods when analyzed through postmodern methodologies reveal that no person can objectively write about the past. He terms history to be a narrative, or a collection of stories. he denies that there is anything called a historical fact, and argues that everything in history is fiction to varying degrees. History, for Jenkins, is a textual and linguistic construct. It is written by 'salaried' historians who narrate (make) histories as a part of their job. Since the gap between history and the past is ontological, there is no way for a historian to have any methodological objectivity, free of bias and prejudice. "History is always for someone. History always has a purpose. History is always about power."

"History is a shifting, problematic discourse, ostensibly about an aspect of the world, the past, that is produced by a group of present-minded workers (overwhelmingly in our culture salaried historians) who go about their work in mutually recognizable ways that are epistemologically, methodologically, ideologically and practically positioned and whose products, once in circulation, are subject to a series of uses and abuses that are logically infinite but which in actuality generally what history is 31 correspond to a range of power bases that exist at any given moment and which structure and distribute the meanings of histories along a dominant-marginal spectrum." (p.31)

Worship and Conflict under Colonial Rule: A South Indian Case/ Arjun Appadurai/ 1981

Appadurai presents a 200 year ethnohistory of a South Indian temple (Parthasarathy Temple in Triplicane, Madras). Following anthropologist Clifford Geertz theories on ethnography and social and cultural systems, Appadurai argues that "alterations in social structure, over time, interact dialectically with a fundamentally unaltered cultural system." He critiques that while several monographs have noted the economic, political, and cultural workings of the temple, these relations have not been analyzed or synthesized. Historians, he says, adopt a "loose-leaf" model where they juxtapose the workings of different parts of temple, but there has not been a study of the temple as a "south Indian institute" from "inside". Hence, his study, links the historical past of the temple with the ethnographic present.

The first chapter begins with the primary argument of the book that there has not been any cultural change in the temple in the last two centuries, while the social system of the temple has reasonably changed. During British rule and in the post independent years, the power residing in the temple has been complicated and authoritative relations have become fragmented in the temple. In short, while the deity in the temple is still accepted as the supreme  authoritative power, there are conflicts about how the power of this authority has to be managed in everyday affairs. He argues that the questions of power and authority is not limited to the domain of rule (the entire cosmos symbolized in a temple) but also extends to the process -- a redistributive process. He sees worship as a redistributive process, and analyses it with the terminologies of economic anthology -- reciprocity and redistribution. While gift-giving in expectation of reciprocity is one side of Hindu worship, he suggests, redistribution is the other. The deity (even its image, at that) is imagined to be "chief" who will give out justices and assume the redistributive role. In the material world this translates  to redistributing the gifts given by "donors"to the deity (food items are dispersed among public, a part  of the donation goes to priests etc.)

The second part of the first chapter discusses several complaints filed by priests and donors claiming their share in the ritual / distributive process of the temple. These citations, Appadurai writes, indicated the fragility in the consciousness of the priests about redistribution. While kings were traditionally seen as "protectors" of the temple, and had the obligation to mitigate conflicts and oversee the redistributive processes of the temple, with the arrival of the British, the conflict resolution became highly complicated. As the role of kings disappeared and the administration of the temple moved from dominant Brahmins (Thenkalai) to State government, the power structure of the temple changed from a hierarchical pyramid to a "complicated set of "honorable" shares in the divine polity of the deity." (61)

The second chapter discusses the role and authority the kings possessed in maintaining of the temple. Through several textual evidences and inscriptional readings, Appadurai suggests that the Parthasarathy temple was highly involved in royal participation and had organized sectarian involvement. Being under British jurisdiction for a century, he argues, resulted in sub-sectarian conflicts over power.

The third chapter, very interestingly, presents three key ways in which temple administration changed under British jurisdiction. First, since British merchants did not view the temples as necessary for their authority (unlike Kings), their interaction with brahmin priests stopped. Second, while kings stayed away from daily activities of the temple and would only involved themselves in resolving conflicts, British stayed away from conflict resolution and gradually got more involved in everyday temple activities. Three, unlike royal system which had both administrative and judicial branches under the same arm, British system often had contradictions involving the two. He examines two conflicts that resulted in prolonged interaction of the temple with the State. In both cases, the cause of the conflict was complicated by the involvement of the British instead of arbitrating amongst the conflicting parties (in the case where which sub-sect of Brahmins should recite prayers in the temple, British decided to cancel prayer recitation until the case was resolved) The revenue flow was centralized and the everyday activities of the temple were made more dependent on the British treasury. Until the British state was called in for arbitration, the temple had maintained much of its affairs. But by 1826, the temple was taken over by the British due to the "explosive nature" of the conflict, and inherent contradictions between the ideas of "protection" and "subordination" in English bureaucratic policy.

The fourth chapter examines the period between 1826 and 1848 where British gradually withdrew its power from temples after reaching the Zenith (in 1820's). Appadurai writes that this withdrawal of power gave rise to new sectarian politics, exacerbation of conflicts over temples, and changed prior notions of 'protection' and 'subordination' in English bureaucracy. After the British withdrew power and appointed trustees to manage the temple, there were several litigations from brahmins and non-brahmins on who should assume power and what compensations they should receive. At this time, the term 'Thenkalai' acquired local and constitutional connotations shedding its sectarian underpinnings.

The fifth chapter of the book discusses the interactions of these litigants with the British judicial system, and the appropriation of the British system to suit Indian purposes. "Because the activities of Hindu kings in respect to temples were "administrative" and not "legislative," and because their resolutions were context specific and not absorbed into a general body of evolving case law, it is no surprise that a "law of endowments" had not been developed." (169). The contrast between traditional way of conflict resolution and British judicial system of using codified law resulted in much more conflict than resolution.

In the final chapter, Appadurai uses this historical analysis of the past to understand the present day workings of the temple and its complex web of power relations. He argues that today the temple has remnants of pre-British King model, British secularization model, and the post-British judiciary model, along with an influence of the modern day political party (DMK party mandated that all prayers have to be recited in Tamil instead of age-old Sanskrit thus breaking the requirements to have Brahmin priests only). He frames the contemporary temple through Geertz's model of distinguishing between 'culture' and 'social structure', and argues that " the set of ideas and symbols that focus on the sovereign personality of the deity constitute the "cultural system" of the temple." and the questions of authority on who will control the temple constitute the "social structure". While the cultural system has remained the same in the last 200 years, the social structure has undergone important changes (220).

Cross question from readings: How would Partha Chatterjee respond to Appadurai's theory of British being called upon as arbitrators in temple disputes and the locals placing British officers in place of kings, as authorities in the redistributive processes of the temple? Chatterjee argues this to be the "spiritual realm" of the natives where they detested any interference from the colonizers. 

Postcolonial Cities / Anthony King / 2009

Kings begins the essay by defining postcolonial cities as it is understood in different parts of the world.  First, postcolonial cities simply refer to cities that were previously colonized. As the city here, is seen solely through the lens of colonialism, postcolonial critics argue that this understanding of postcolonial city privileges a western interpretation of the city over an indigenous one. The second understanding of postcolonial cities refer to metropoles such as Paris, London, Birmingham or Amsterdam which are inhabited by large number of immigrants from their previous colonies, and since the fabric of the city itself has changed after the end of colonialism.

Postcolonial cities have usually been dichotomous and dualistic in nature (Ex:Algiers) where a native indigenous core is separated and demarcated from the colonizers' neighborhoods. While the native core will have poor sanitation, narrow roads, small houses etc, the colonial part will have wide boulevards and large bungalows. King writes, during the 1960's - 70's several native scholars were dissatisfied with western theories being applied to colonial contexts (Chicago school to understand Africa),  and through use of local archives and native knowledge produced three key findings about postcolonial cities. First, the colonial part of the city which was thought to be inspired by the modern cities of the west was often grossly exaggerated by the colonizers to deepen the divide between themselves and the natives. Second, the newly independent nations often retained earlier colonial buildings as an affront to their democratic aspiration (modernization). Third, the spaces that were vacated by the colonizer after independence were occupied by the indigenous elite, symbolizing their role as new rulers of an inferior class.

King critiques the use of the term postcolonial cities as being an "outsider's label", where a city is made to exist in the shadow of its colonial past long after independence. He condemns the terminology that makes postcolonial cities remain forever in the shadow, and asks how they can metamorphose into global cities like Hong Kong and Singapore. The term 'Postcolonial' cannot be free from the burden of its anglophone positionally and its disseminence from western discourse.

The third section, compares the earlier studies of postcolonial cities by european scholars with the 20th century work of natives. While European studies propagated and supported the dual city narrative, the natives' study portrayed the city as a product of indigenous hybridization. It was argued that the colonial parts of the city provided an opportunity for the indigenous elites to assimilate with the colonial officials. While in some cities colonial urbanism was disliked, in some other cities like Jakarta that had a dictatorial rule after independence, viewed colonial urban projects as a 'gift' from the enlightened.

The final section brings to foreground the ambivalence in the terms 'post-colonial' and 'post-imperial'. King argues that the applying term post-imperial for former metropoles like Paris (instead of grouping all cities under the umbrella postcolonial) will make clear the suppositions being made about the city's history. Quoting Brenda Yeoh, he argues that postcolonial cities are umbilically connected to their colonial metropoles. Cultural hybridization in cities like Paris and Britain where large number of former colonial population lives is a testimony to their continual connections.

Question: For how long will the shadows of colonialism haunt the (post)colonial city? Although some cities like HongKong and Singapore have come out on their own and forayed into the 'global world', there are several other cities stuck with their dual characters still fighting the demons of colonialism. In this light, can be there be one understanding of 'The Postcolonial City'? 

Can the Subaltern Speak? / Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak/ 1988

Spivak begins the essay by critiquing Foucault and Deluze who are inattentive to their own position of power in narrating a third world subject, and are ignorant of the implications of transplanting western ideological theories into colonial discourse of oppression. In a debate, Foucault and Deluze emphasized on the "counter-productiveness to reduce the networks of power/desire/interest because they are so heterogeneous and the need for intellectuals to disclose their knowledge and know the discourse of the Other." Yet, she writes, "they systematically ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual and economic history" (66). She argues that the representation of 'subalterns' by western intellectuals is one that they have unconsciously created themselves by falsely pretending to be "transparent" (The example given is of Foucault where in an interview at an "unguarded moment" he gives away the pretense). She argues the knowledge production in the west is also a commodity having deep roots in social, economic and institutional capital. Spivak questions the use of the terms, 'Maoist' and ' the worker's struggle' by French theorists in their discourse of revolution. She criticizes the usage of these essentialist terms as they assume a cultural solidarity for a heterogeneous group. Foucault and Deluze, she argues, represent the Other through their own cultural system. The second part of the essay clarifies the meaning of Subject and Subjectivity in Subaltern studies as compared to the Marxist Subject. She argues that colonial Subject is a heterogenous entity and cannot be understood as an undivided consciousness striving for the same things. She writes, "My view is that radical practice should attend to this double session of representations rather than reintroduce the individual subject through totalizing concepts of power and desire" (74).

In arguing against Foucault's narrative of the epistemic violence as being located in late 18th century Europe, Spivak uses examples from 17th and 18th century colonial India. First, she examines the British reformation of traditional legal system in India that was based on Hindu Dharmashastra that used Shruti, Smruti, Shastra, Vyavahara as four tools in settling disputes. The codification of these traditional laws in accordance to British value system is symbolic of the epistemic violence by the colonizers. Accompanied by suppression of Sanskrit in the overhauled educational system, a version of history was gradually established where Brahmins were shown to have same intentions as the British in writing down the laws in 'high culture' Sanskrit and making them rigid and inaccessible to lower castes, peasants, and tribals. Here, she argues, that while Foucault and Deluze propose that the 'oppressed' in the first-world can speak or revolt, they do because they have access to socialized capital (Foucault) and know their conditions, whereas the subaltern of the third world cannot.

The final part of the essay uses the example of Sati practice in 18th century India and the suicide of an Indian woman to further explain the notions of epistemic violence in the colonized nation. Indian women were initially 'spoken for' by the learned Brahmins (men) who inscribed the importance of Sati (widows committing suicide by jumping into the burning pyre of their dead husband), and indirectly controlled what an 'ideal Hindu woman', 'a good wife' should and shouldn't do. Here, even though several Indian narratives portray women as voluntarily wanting to commit suicide post their husband's death, one should be aware that these women were a part of intrinsic belief system that was circulated through generations by power yielding Brahmins (brown men). As Spivak's often misunderstood and controversial sentence - "White men saving brown women from brown men" - suggests, at the end of 18th century, British reformers noticing this barbaric practice banned the practice of Sati, much to the anger of brown men. The larger point of this example is to showcase that women who belonged to the lowest strata of the subaltern, had absolutely no agency. First, they were ‘spoken for’ by the Brahmins, and then by the British. They could not speak. Additionally, as the suicide of Bhuvaneswari indicates, despite trying to displace the sanctioned hegemonic narrative, the subaltern as female cannot even be heard or read.


Paragraph Summary:
Spivak's question is not one that looks for a binary answer, but it rather is an enquiry into the agency of a subaltern and whether it is possible for a subaltern to speak. Even as she answers her own question negatively, she presents a four-fold argument on the nature and perceptions of the colonial Subaltern by the western world, by calling intellectual behemoths as her witnesses.
a) Western theorists impose their own value system when examining the Subaltern. b) The Subject cannot be described in Marxian terms as an undivided personality. It has to be understood as "divided and dislocated subjects whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other". c) Earlier explorations of the Subaltern studies Collective examined the colonial Subject as a coherent whole and suppressed the heterogeneity of the subaltern consciousness. She cautions the subaltern theorists that the voice of the Subaltern is being heard through a group of intellectuals, which can seem like French theorists' who speak for oppressed groups using essentialist terms of 'workers' or 'maoists'. d) Using the example of British codifying Hindu laws and legal system, she argues that "epistemic violence" -- a complete overhaul of the episteme -- is not located in Europe at the end of 18th century as Foucault identifies, but rather is present in the epistemic violence carried out by Europe in the nations it colonized.